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The Path of Robotics Law 
Jack M. Balkin* 
INTRODUCTION 
What are the key problems that robotics presents for law? To answer this 
question, Ryan Calo argues that we should make an analogy to cyberlaw. First, 
we should identify the “essential qualities” of the new technology, and then we 
should ask how the law should respond to the problems posed by those 
essential qualities.1 
Calo’s account of the problems that robotics present for law is just terrific, 
and I believe it is destined to be the starting point for much future research in 
the area. This Essay builds on his ideas and takes them in a somewhat different 
direction. 
First, I draw different lessons than Calo from the history of cyberlaw and 
from encounters between law and new technology. I do not think it is helpful to 
speak in terms of “essential qualities” of a new technology that we can then 
apply to law. On the contrary, we should try not to think about characteristics 
of technology as if these features were independent of how people use 
technology in their lives and in their social relations with others. Because the 
use of technology in social life evolves, and because people continually find 
new ways to employ technology for good or for ill, it may be unhelpful to 
freeze certain features of use at a particular moment and label them “essential.” 
Second, I describe the problems posed by robotics for law a little 
differently than Calo does, in part because I do not distinguish sharply between 
robots and artificial intelligence (AI) agents. As innovation proceeds, the 
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distinction between these two kinds of technologies may be far less important 
to the law than it seems at present; we do not yet know whether the boundaries 
between these two technologies will increasingly blur (as I expect) or further 
differentiate. 
Instead, I will emphasize two key problems that robotics and artificial 
intelligence present for law. The first is how to distribute human rights and 
responsibilities that arise from the actions of nonhumans. Human beings will 
use robots and AI entities to create new things and to violate the legally 
protected interests of other human beings. AI agents will churn out novels; but 
they will also spy on people and defame them. Robots will invent new things; 
but they will also break people’s limbs. Calo suggests, correctly, I think, that 
we are still a long way from treating robots and AI agents as self-conscious 
rights-bearing or responsibility-bearing entities.2 Therefore the key question for 
law—at least at this early point in history—is how to allocate rights and duties 
among human beings when robots and AI entities create benefits or cause 
injuries. 
The second problem is a generalization of the first. I call it the 
“substitution effect”—the fact that people will substitute robots and AI agents 
for living things, and especially for humans. But they will do so only in certain 
ways and only for certain purposes. This substitution is likely to be contextual, 
unstable, and often opportunistic. The problem of substitution touches many 
different areas of law, and it promises to confound us for a very long time. 
I. 
THE LESSONS OF CYBERLAW 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s famous 1897 lecture, The Path of the Law,3 
argued that because law is produced by the cumulative forces of social life, we 
should view law from the standpoint of its social function and practical use. 
Holmes offered a proto-Realist manifesto against formalism and the belief in 
essential features of legal concepts. All American lawyers, Calo and myself 
included, are intellectual descendants of Holmes’s pragmatism. Rejecting 
essentialism in law helps us focus on law’s basis in social relations and law’s 
role in maintaining—and occasionally mystifying or apologizing for—
relationships of authority and power. We should adopt a similar anti-formalism 
when we think about technology and law’s encounters with innovation. 
When we consider how a new technology affects law, our focus should 
not be on what is essential about the technology but on what features of social 
life the technology makes newly salient. What problems does a new technology 
place in the foreground that were previously underemphasized or deemed less 
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important? What aspects of human activity or of the human condition does a 
technological change foreground, emphasize, or problematize? And once 
technology moves a certain problem or a certain feature of our lives from the 
background to the foreground of our concern, what are the consequences for 
human freedom?4 
The features that are most salient about our technology may depend on 
how people come to use it. Often people use technology in ways its designers 
did not foresee or intend. That is especially so for what Jonathan Zittrain calls 
“generative” technologies,5 which offer multiple sites and possibilities for 
innovation. What seems particularly important and salient about technology 
changes over time as people work with and through new technology. 
Moreover, technology, like law, mediates social relations between human 
beings—including relations of power and control. Because those relations are 
always evolving, our assessment of what is most interesting or worrisome 
about a technology may change too. 
Today, people carry microcomputers in their purses and pockets called 
“cell phones.” Thirty years ago people might have argued that an essential 
characteristic of a cell phone was its ability to make a phone call outside of 
one’s home. But this feature of cell phones is by no means the primary way that 
people use them today. Instead, people’s habits developed alongside 
developments in mobile technology. What people use their phones for now—
through a kaleidoscope of different applications—makes the very word 
“phone” seem like a relic of a past age. 
In 1991, before widespread adoption of the World Wide Web, the Internet 
was used mostly for e-mail and for exchanging files through protocols like 
Gopher. (Search functionality was primitive and Google had yet to be 
invented.) Then, one might have imagined that the Internet’s “essential” 
features were its abilities to cross jurisdictional lines at will, to send digital 
information quickly and cheaply, and to facilitate anonymous communication. 
But this is because, at that point in history, that is how people imagined human 
beings would use the technology and the kinds of social relations of power, 
action, and vulnerability that these uses would engender. The characteristics of 
a new technology, in short, are partly the product of current use and partly the 
work of human imagination about potential affordances and opportunities, 
dangers and threats. 
By 1999, it was clearer that states could control features of Internet traffic 
and that the degree of truly anonymous communication the Internet afforded 
was overstated. Dreams of multiple cyberworlds free from the reach of 
territorial governments had given way to increasing concerns about filtering 
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and surveillance. The first edition of Lawrence Lessig’s book, Code,6 
emphasized how much the Internet had changed between 1995 and 1999. A 
key theme was that these changes showed that the Internet did not have to be 
designed in any particular way, and that it could become either 
characteristically free or controlled.7 Similarly, as Yochai Benkler pointed out, 
the Internet is not a single medium of communication—whether one-to-many 
or many-to-one or many-to-many—but rather a platform for creating multiple 
media with many different characteristics, affordances, and opportunities for 
social action.8 By the time Benkler wrote The Wealth of Networks in 2006 and 
Clay Shirky published Here Comes Everybody in 2008,9 the Internet seemed to 
have been transformed once again. Now, its most prominent feature was its 
ability to lower the cost of organization, to facilitate crowdsourcing and open-
source projects, and to undercut professional norms of information production 
in areas ranging from music to journalism to science. Calo’s own account of 
the “essential” characteristics of the Internet10 is a retrospective view that 
builds on more than two decades of social and technological innovation, rather 
than a timeless account of inherent properties. 
The Internet of 1991 is so unlike the Internet of 2015 that it is almost hard 
to imagine. Although there are family resemblances between the two, the 
differences are vast, due to the amazing ingenuity of countless human beings 
who innovated in social and economic relations as much as in hardware and 
software. 
We might say, then, that the most important lesson of cyberlaw for 
robotics is the need to attend to the relationships between affordance and 
imagination, between tools and relations of power, between technological 
substrate and social use. The characteristics of robotics that currently draw our 
attention, that disturb our legal complacency, that create puzzles for law and 
opportunities for social innovation, will not be the last puzzles and 
opportunities we face. 
Indeed, what lawyers call “technology” is usually a shorthand for 
something far more complex. When we talk about “technology,” we are really 
talking about (1) how people interact with new inventions and (2) how people 
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interact with other people using those new inventions or presupposing those 
new inventions. What we call the effects of technology are not so much 
features of things as they are features of social relations that employ those 
things. These social relations include relationships of power and authority, 
forms of human organization and production, and features of human sexuality, 
association, and family life. 
Similarly, innovation in technology is not just innovation of tools and 
techniques; it may also involve innovation of economic, social, and legal 
relations. As we innovate socially and economically, what appears most salient 
and important about our tools may also change. If the Internet of 1991 looks 
radically different from that of 2015, it is not only because our tools have 
evolved; it is also because how people live, work, and contend with each other 
has evolved in interaction with those tools. As our world fills with robotic and 
AI technologies, our lives and relationships of social, political, and economic 
power will also change, posing new and unexpected challenges for law. 
II. 
WHAT DO ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MAKE SALIENT? 
A. Let’s Get Physical 
Calo explains that robots create new problems for law because robots can 
cause physical harm rather than just economic or emotional harm.11 Calo calls 
this feature “embodiment,”12 but that term may be a bit misleading. Computers 
have always been embodied in physical form—think of the huge IBM 
mainframes of the past. Moreover, computers have always had the ability to 
cause physical harm because of their physical embodiment—for example, a 
laptop can cause physical injury if it is thrown, or if it is dropped on a person’s 
foot and breaks a toe. 
Rather, Calo’s point is that robots can cause physical harm because of 
their programming, or more precisely, the cumulative effect of their hardware, 
operating system, and software.13 These allow a robot to interact with its 
environment and have physical effects on the world. So although Calo’s 
concern may seem to be primarily about the capacity to cause physical harm, 
the deeper issue is that harm—whether physical, emotional, or monetary—is 
caused by programmability and interactivity. The fact that robots have bodies 
plays a different role in what Calo calls “social valence”—the notion, among 
other things, that people tend to treat interactive moving objects as if they are 
alive.14 But here again, what is important is not that robots have a physical 
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form—so do toasters—but that their interactivity creates particular social cues 
in human beings. 
A robot’s ability to cause physical injury is not really an “essential” 
characteristic of robotic technology. It is a particularly salient feature of 
robotics for lawyers, but the reason that it is salient is that, as Calo explains, 
from the early days of the Internet, judges decided to adapt existing tort law 
doctrines to limit liability for purely economic losses caused by new digital 
technologies.15 Similarly, Congress created a series of legislative immunities 
for online service providers that limited liability for copyright infringement or 
harmful communication that used digital networks.16 The problem of physical 
injury is not simply a feature of essential characteristics of a technology. 
Rather, it arises from the way that a new technology interacts with a social and 
legal world already in place. 
A new technology enters into a social world already in motion, with an 
existing set of assumptions and expectations about what is likely and unlikely, 
possible and impossible, an existing set of norms about social life, and a set of 
paradigmatic examples about how things work and what we should do in 
response to problems. From law’s standpoint, we might call these assumptions 
and expectations about how the world works the scene of regulation.17 The new 
technology disrupts the existing scene of regulation, leading various actors to 
scramble over how the technology will and should be used. As people scramble 
and contend with each other over the technology, they innovate—not only 
technologically, but also socially, economically, and legally—leading to new 
problems for law. Instead of saying that law is responding to essential features 
of new technology, it might be better to say that social struggles over the use of 
new technology are being inserted into existing features of law, disrupting 
expectations about how to categorize situations. 
Classifying the capacity of programmable entities to create physical harm 
as an “essential characteristic” of robotics has another disadvantage. It may 
lead us to neglect the diversity of systems that employ artificial intelligence and 
self-learning. Indeed, as Calo points out, there is a continuum between “robots” 
and “artificial intelligence.”18 That is because, like the Internet itself, robots 
and other interactive entities do not have to be designed in any particular way. 
And because there is a continuum of potential designs and a variety of different 
potential uses, there is also a continuum of potential effects that these new 
technologies can have. Self-learning algorithms can raise or lower temperatures 
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in a house, turn on appliances, lock or unlock gates, and notify security 
services. Algorithms can buy and sell securities; they can create holographic 
projections that look and act like people; they can threaten, entertain, copy, 
defame, defraud, warn, console, or seduce. These various effects straddle the 
lines between the physical, the economic, the social, and the emotional. 
We may be misled if we insist on too sharp a distinction between robotics 
and AI systems, because we do not yet know all the ways that technology will 
be developed and deployed. Similarly, we may also be misled if, in order to 
preserve the theory of “essential” characteristics, we try to shoehorn all of these 
effects and harms into “physical” effects and harms. A robotic cat designed as a 
companion for an elderly person to pet and care for engages the physical and 
the emotional. A smart home that controls temperature, orders our groceries, 
and briefs us on our day combines the physical, the economic, and the social. 
We should be attentive to the diversity of uses that our technologies will have, 
and therefore to the diversity of harms and threats that these technologies might 
pose. 
We might identify many different features of a technology as its key or 
essential characteristics, but the real issue is always why we care about them. 
How we define the central features of a technology depends on what our 
definition is for, and the purpose it serves in our particular area of inquiry. If 
we are engineers trying to solve a design problem, we will focus on different 
aspects of the technology than if we are lawyers trying to solve a problem of 
legal rights and liabilities. Not surprisingly, lawyers tend to view technology 
through the lens of existing legal doctrines and present policy concerns. 
Lawyers may be interested—and should be interested—in how engineers and 
computer scientists define their terms; but lawyers’ interest flows from their 
ability to relate these ideas to legal and policy problems. 
B. Code is Lawless 
Both robots and AI agents create problems for law because one cannot 
always predict what they will do when they interact with their environment. 
Calo calls this feature “emergence”19 or “emergent behavior.”20 I agree with 
him that, at least at this point in history, “emergence” is a more helpful term 
than “autonomy,” which raises a host of difficult questions about the status of 
artificial intelligence. The problem of “emergence,” however, cross-cuts with 
the problem of physical harm. Several of Calo’s examples—flash trading, 
algorithmic speech, and automated copyright or patent infringement—involve 
emergence but do not threaten physical injury.21 Nevertheless, some of these 
injuries—for example, the destabilization of securities markets—can be 
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catastrophic even if they do not involve physical harm. Surely these kinds of 
injuries are just as important to law’s encounter with new technology, but they 
further undermine the assumption that a capacity to cause physical injury is an 
“essential” characteristic of the technologies we are interested in. 
By contrast, the idea of emergent behavior may seem far more “essential” 
to robotics, especially when we consider robots together with AI systems 
generally. But the importance of this feature, too, is produced by the interaction 
of new technologies with existing law. If law had easy or obvious solutions to 
injuries by robots and AI systems, we would not consider the fact that robots 
and AI systems make decisions for themselves to be particularly distinctive or 
salient in the eyes of the law, even though this fact might be important for 
technological, moral, or philosophical reasons. As Calo suggests, however, 
emergent behavior by robots and AI systems does create new difficulties for 
existing legal doctrine.22 That is why lawyers care about it. 
The problem of emergence is the problem of who we will hold 
responsible for what code does. Lawrence Lessig’s famous dictum that “Code 
is Law” argued that combinations of computer hardware and software, like 
other modalities of regulation, could constrain and direct human behavior.23 
Emergence presents the converse problem: self-learning systems may be 
neither predictable nor constrained by human expectations about proper 
behavior. Code is lawless. 
We can divide this concern into two problems. First, we must assign 
responsibility for injuries—whether physical, economic, or emotional—caused 
by interactive and/or self-learning systems. We might hold many different 
potential actors liable, including the owner, operator, retailer, hardware 
designer, operating system designer, or programmer(s), to name only a few 
possibilities. 
What degree of fault should we require of these potential defendants? The 
easy case, and the one for which the law is already well prepared, involves a 
defendant who programs a robot to harm another. But in most cases, it will be 
difficult to show either a deliberate intent to harm or knowledge that harm will 
occur. One might then turn to theories of negligence. But although the risk of 
some kind of injury at some point in the future is foreseeable whenever one 
introduces a new technology, how and when an injury occurs may not be 
particularly foreseeable to each of the potential defendants in the above list. If 
the law hopes to assign responsibility to humans and corporations, injuries by 
robotic and AI systems may strain traditional concepts of foreseeability. 
Liability without fault is a traditional solution, but it may stifle innovation in a 
developing area, and it may not be an appropriate solution in the context of 
criminal law. 
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A second problem—of causal responsibility—follows from the first. The 
programming and algorithms used by robots and AI entities will likely be the 
work of many hands. The example of digital networks is instructive. Jonathan 
Zittrain’s concept of generativity explains the Internet’s seemingly 
inexhaustible capacity for innovation in terms of multiple layers of potential 
variation.24 There is a hardware layer through which digital content travels, a 
protocol layer that creates a common language for exchange, and successive 
layers of software built one upon the other.25 And there is also a “social 
layer”—the social activities, customs, and organizations that grow up around 
generative technologies and find interesting and novel ways to use and alter 
them.26 Innovation may occur in each layer, combining the work of many 
different people. 
For example, at the software layer, open source projects take advantage of 
the Internet’s ability to lower the costs of organization. These projects—and 
many commercial projects as well—are often perpetually changing through 
successive updates and fixes. Software programs may also serve as platforms 
for apps, plug-ins, and modifications of infinite variety produced by third 
parties. 
Robots and AI algorithms build on these practices of innovation; we can 
understand them in terms of multiple layers of hardware, protocol, and 
software offering multiple opportunities for innovation and alteration by 
multiple actors. The more opportunities for innovation and alteration, however, 
the more difficult it will be to locate and demonstrate responsibility for 
emergent behavior that harms another. 
Software—especially mature and complex software—is likely to have 
bugs or produce unpredictable results. Bugs may be difficult to spot and may 
develop through the combination of multiple modifications and additions. It 
may be fiendishly difficult to affix responsibility for bugs that emerge from 
layers of software development by many hands. And to the extent that robots 
and AI programs learn how to modify their own code, the questions of 
responsibility become even more diffuse. 
The problem of security is the flip side of the problem of causal 
responsibility: the more opportunities for innovation, the more possible targets 
for hacking. Here, Lessig’s famous idea of regulation by code turns into its 
opposite. Instead of code as a law that regulates humans, code features a kind 
of lawlessness that escapes human regulation. As James Grimmelmann has 
pointed out, it is characteristic of much regulation by software that it is 
hackable and not robust.27 Once a software system is hacked it may fail 
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instantaneously in ways that are not immediately obvious; and the system may 
be unable to recover on its own without human intervention.28 
To make matters worse, many robots and AI systems will probably be 
continually connected to the Internet and will continually take in new 
information and new programming from multiple sources. Self-driving cars, for 
example, could be designed as part of a giant network of interactive robots, 
constantly sending each other information about local driving conditions. 
Regular updates to the operating system might be downloaded to each car 
without the end-user’s knowledge.29 Indeed, we should expect that some of the 
most useful and widely employed robotic and AI systems will be connected to 
the Internet cloud. This means that these systems will not be self-contained 
entities, but will continually be updated by communication with other robots 
and AI entities, as well as centralized and decentralized sources of information. 
Quite apart from the security problems that cloud robotics presents, it also 
complicates and diffuses responsibility for accidents. 
Calo explains that these problems follow from the “promiscuity” of data 
that is characteristic of digital networks generally.30 The metaphor of 
“promiscuity” suggests that nodes on the network are continually sharing 
information with many other nodes (like a person who has intercourse with 
many different people). The metaphor of “promiscuity” also suggests 
vulnerability to infection (by analogy to venereal disease), hacking, and harm. 
Calo connects the promiscuity of data to the problem of embodiment—that is, 
the capacity to cause physical harm.31 That is because promiscuous sharing of 
data and ease of reprogramming wasn’t such a problem when the only harm 
that resulted was nonphysical. 
I would look at the issue differently. I would associate the interconnected 
nature of the Internet, digital generativity, and the multiple layers of innovation 
with the problem of emergence. That is because from the standpoint of law—as 
opposed to the standpoint of engineering—the problem posed by emergence is 
the problem of assigning responsibility for the unpredictable behavior of robots 
and AI systems. 
Calo emphasizes that this unpredictability comes from the complexity of 
algorithms, including those that learn from experience.32 That is certainly an 
important cause of the problem for law, but it is not the only one. Multiple 
layers of innovation, the generativity of digital systems, and the easy flow of 
data are also reasons why we may be unable to predict what self-learning or 
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interactive systems will do once we set them loose on the world. This is yet 
another reason why “emergence” is a better term than “autonomy.” A self-
learning system is not made more autonomous because of the fact that it is 
structured in layers, generative, modular, buggy, and the work of many hands. 
Rather, these features are related to the reasons why the law cares about 
emergence: they enhance the possibility that self-learning systems will solve 
problems and perform tasks in ways that we will not foresee or expect. 
The problem of emergence works in the opposite direction as well—
instead of harms, emergent behaviors may create multiple social benefits. For 
example, robots and AI systems will create new inventions and literary works. 
The question is who will enjoy the intellectual property rights, or whether, 
instead, the creations will enter the public domain.33 Search algorithms produce 
speech in the form of rankings; they may also automatically fill in or complete 
search queries. Should we treat this expression as part of the speech of the 
search engine company, and therefore protect it from regulation under the First 
Amendment?34 
We are likely to see considerable opportunism in the legal arguments that 
people make about robots and AI systems. People will claim credit (and legal 
protection) for whatever benefits their robots create, while denying 
responsibility whenever their robots destroy property, infringe copyright, make 
threats, or engage in defamation. People will downplay emergence when the 
system produces benefits that they might capture for themselves and emphasize 
emergence when the system causes harm. It is a variation on the old saying that 
“success has a thousand fathers; failure is an orphan.” The goal for law is to 
meet this predictable opportunism, and to come up with a rational allocation of 
benefits and responsibilities for both robotic creations and robotic injuries. 
III. 
THE SUBSTITUTION EFFECT 
The third feature of robotics that Calo calls essential is the tendency of 
human beings to respond to robots as if they are interacting with people. He 
calls this tendency “social valence,”35 and argues that “to a greater degree than 
perhaps any technology in history, robots have a social meaning to people.”36 
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Of course, people do not necessarily respond to robots as if they were 
people. They may respond to them as if they were animals. Consider a robotic 
dog that one trains to do tricks, or a robotic seal designed for elderly patients to 
pet. What Calo is describing might be either anthropomorphism (ascribing 
human features) or zoomorphism (ascribing animal features). The more general 
point, however, is that human beings project agency on non-living things. 
Humans may also project emotions, feelings of pleasure and pain, the capacity 
to form relationships with others, and the capacity to care for others and be 
cared by them in turn. The projection of human or animal emotions onto 
inanimate objects is as old as history itself. People hear the wind howl and the 
ocean roar; they project agency and loyalty onto their ships and cars. The 
projection of humanity onto what is not human is the reflection of the self on 
the outside world. 
It is worth noting, once again, that this tendency is not unique to robotics; 
it is also true of AI systems. Spike Jonze’s 2013 movie Her37 is about a man 
who falls in love with an operating system, not a robot. Robots may cause 
people to see them as alive because they move; but AI systems may cause 
people to see them as alive because they speak. And if the concern is 
anthropomorphism, people have associated the power of speech with humanity 
far more than the power of motion.38 
The first two characteristics of robotics that Calo identified—the capacity 
to cause physical harm and emergent behavior—create obvious problems for 
assigning liability in tort and criminal law. That is why they are particularly 
interesting to lawyers. What Calo calls “social valence,” however, is a far more 
complex phenomenon. It is not limited to the question of legal liability but 
concerns every way that robots and AI agents might intervene in social 
relations. Not surprisingly, Calo offers a diverse array of possible 
consequences. For example, he points out (1) that the more anthropomorphic a 
robot, the more people will assign blame to the robot rather than to a person 
using the robot;39 (2) that the presence of robots in a system of surveillance 
heightens the subjective sense that one is being observed;40 (3) that human 
beings will take greater risks to preserve the integrity of anthropomorphic 
robots than they would for things designated as tools;41 and (4) that human 
beings may suffer distinctive emotional harms for the loss of robotic 
companions.42 Finally, building on the work of Kate Darling, Calo suggests 
that anthropomorphic robots pose problems of moral harm: people who 
 
 37. HER (Annapurna Pictures 2013). 
 38. See, e.g., JOHN HEATH, THE TALKING GREEKS: SPEECH, ANIMALS AND THE OTHER IN 
HOMER, AESCHYLUS, AND PLATO 1 (2005) (arguing that the Ancient Greeks saw the power of speech 
as the most important difference between human and animal natures). 
 39. Calo, supra note 1, at 547–48. 
 40. Id. at 547. 
 41. Id. at 548. 
 42. Id. 
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mistreat anthropomorphic robots may coarsen or degrade themselves in the 
same way as people who abuse people and animals, even if no third party is 
actually harmed.43 
Calo’s brief discussion scratches only the surface of what is at stake, and 
“social valence” may not be the best way of describing it. All of his examples 
revolve around a basic problem produced by the introduction of robotics and 
artificial intelligence into society. The problem is not that people confuse 
robots for living things, for usually they do not. Rather, the problem is that, 
through their interactions with robots and AI systems, people are willing to 
substitute them for animals or human beings in certain contexts and for certain 
purposes. Call this the substitution effect. People cause an entity to stand in for 
a human or animal and they treat the entity as such—but only in certain ways. 
In other words, people treat robots and AI agents as special-purpose animals or 
as special-purpose human beings. Calo puts it well when he speaks of “a new 
category of legal subject halfway between person and object.”44 The placement 
is “halfway” because the assignment of status may be incomplete, contextual, 
unstable, and, above all, opportunistic. People may treat the robot as a person 
(or animal) for some purposes and as an object for others. 
I call this a substitution effect because in many cases we do not regard a 
substitute as fully identical to the thing for which it substitutes. Rather, it is 
only equivalent provisionally, in certain contexts or for certain purposes, and 
people often reserve the right to reject the asserted identity when it suits them. 
The substitute teacher in a fourth grade classroom may lack the students’ full 
respect, and probably doesn’t enjoy the benefits of the regular instructor’s 
pension plan. Despite what the manufacturers of substitutes for butter, cream, 
and sugar tell us, we don’t treat these dietary substitutes as the genuine article. 
Rather, we use them to avoid the calories or the fat associated with the real 
thing. That is, people use the substitute to try to get the best of both worlds—
the students get taught about fractions at lower cost; we get the satisfaction of 
butter with half the calories. 
Projecting human emotions, feelings, and goals onto inanimate objects is 
a special case of substitution. Our imagination makes the robot stand in the 
place of a human being or animal in some respect. This is the original meaning 
of a “substitute,” which comes from the Latin substituere, derived from 
sub+statuere, meaning to set up under or stand in the place of another.45 A 
substitute is something set up or placed under something to replace or displace 
it. 
 
 43. Id. at 548–49 (citing Kate Darling, Extending Legal Rights to Social Robots, in ROBOT 
LAW (Ryan Calo et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044797). 
 44. Id. at 549. 
 45. See MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/substitute (providing etymology of substitute). 
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The substitution of robot for living thing may be innocent, emotional, 
almost instinctual. The patient who blames a surgical robot for a botched 
procedure projects a partial humanity—and hence responsibility—onto the 
technology. The soldier who mourns the loss of his bomb-disarming robot 
projects onto the robot human qualities of comradeship, courage, and 
commitment to fellow soldiers. When a companion robot who operates in our 
home sends personal data about us to a corporation, we feel betrayed, when we 
would never think that a camera and a microphone could betray us. 
Most of the forms of substitution that Calo describes are not deliberate—
they may simply reflect how human beings react to moving objects and 
speaking programs. But equally interesting forms of substitution are deliberate 
and instrumental. A government might replace human soldiers with robots 
because the latter have no families and don’t come home in body bags; their 
wanton destruction is less likely to undermine political support for a war. 
Corporations may substitute robots for workers because robots won’t unionize, 
won’t need coffee breaks, and don’t suffer from alcohol abuse, emotional 
problems, or other causes of subpar performance and absenteeism. This 
practice of substitution, unlike the emotional or instinctual substitution 
described above, is conscious and purposive. Our choice to use robots is like 
our choice to use margarine or nondairy creamer—it seems to offer all of the 
benefits of humans with none of the costs. 
The law might also deliberately treat robots as if they were living agents 
for practical reasons or for reasons of public policy. For example, we might 
protect robots from certain forms of abuse because we fear that people who 
abuse robots might also abuse people, children, or animals. We might impute 
mens rea to a robot or algorithm as a legal fiction in order to make it easier to 
apply the law of respondeat superior, criminal concepts of aiding and abetting, 
or accomplice liability to owners, operators, or designers. Similarly, courts 
might treat AI-produced art as a “work for hire” in order to minimize changes 
to existing copyright law. When we employ legal fictions of this kind, we 
substitute robot for human to allow the law to function effectively in the face of 
the legal enigmas posed by emergent behavior. Or we might adopt legal 
fictions to keep existing legal doctrines working provisionally until we can 
produce more thorough and coherent reforms. 
I have just described two kinds of substitution—unconscious or 
emotional, and purposive or instrumental. In fact, they are two sides of a coin. 
A substitute serves in the place of another—like a substitute teacher—or is 
used in the place of another—as when we substitute margarine for butter in a 
recipe. Notions of service and use apply both in emotional substitution and 
practical substitution. We make robots serve our emotions and our practical 
needs; we use them to fulfill our desires and our projects. As in Hegel’s famous 
dialectic of master and slave, we may become dependent on what we use and 
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on what serves us.46 Robots and AI agents may perform tasks that we no longer 
can (or are willing to) perform for ourselves; they may offer us emotional 
succor that we find we can no longer do without. 
A key feature of robotic substitution is that it is partial. Robots and AI 
entities take on particular aspects and capacities of persons—for example, their 
capacity to labor, their capacity to fight and kill, their capacity to nurture, their 
capacity to create, their capacity to console, entertain, or sexually satisfy. 
Through using robots and AI agents, human characteristics and skills can be 
segmented, isolated, and dispersed. This is what I mean when I say that robots 
and AI agents operate as “special-purpose human beings”; they are agents for a 
particular reason or function, straddling the line between selves and tools, or 
persons and instruments. 
At first glance, the notion of a “substitute”—and only a partial substitute 
at that—might suggest lack or inferiority. Margarine is not as healthy as butter; 
the apprentice mechanic who shows up is less skilled than the one who 
couldn’t make the scheduled appointment. But substitution may also involve 
abundance and superiority. Substitution not only promises the possibility of 
greater benefits with lower costs, but it may offer skills and performances 
better than humans can offer. In such cases, the substitute promises to be super-
human. The robot companion promises to better cater to our emotional needs, 
the AI trading program engages in arbitrage faster and more efficiently than the 
floor trader, the robot army mows down the enemy more efficiently, and so on. 
In fact, it is the very partiality of the substitution that makes it superior. The 
robot caretaker doesn’t tire of attending to our needs, and the robot soldier 
doesn’t suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder, because neither of them is 
fully human. 
I began this Essay by noting that technology concerns not merely the 
relationship of persons to things but rather the social relationships between 
people that are mediated by things. When the “things” at issue are substitutes 
for people, or special-purpose people, the mediation of social relationships 
between human beings is even further obscured. Our interactions with robots 
and AI systems are interactions with the people who are deploying these new 
technologies, even when we do not realize it. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay I’ve argued against essentialism in law’s encounter with 
technology, advocating instead that we should always keep the social aspects of 
technology in mind. Because we innovate in social relations along with 
technology, we cannot always tell what will be most important about 
 
 46. GEORG WILLIAM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 117 (Arnold 
Vincent Miller trans., 1979) (1807) (“[J]ust as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of 
what it wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it 
immediately is.”). 
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technology in the years to come. Yet, in one respect, the possibilities and 
dangers of robotics seem clearer to us in 2015 than the promise and threat of 
the Internet did in the early 1990s. Already we think we grasp what the law of 
robotics will be “about.” 
One reason why we may have strong notions of what robotics can do and 
the problems it can cause is that we have a rich literature of literary examples 
that concern the substitution effect. Indeed, the substitution effect may be one 
of the oldest tropes in artistic history. The legendary craftsman Daedalus, for 
example, was said to have created statues so lifelike that they had to be chained 
up to keep them from running away.47 Throughout human history people have 
told stories of human artifacts that “come alive” and substitute for various 
functions of human beings. Examples range from Pygmalion’s statue Galatea, 
to the Golem of Prague, to Rossum’s Universal Robots, to the endless 
variations on the tale of Frankenstein, to Isaac Asimov’s robot stories and 
Three Laws of Robotics, to familiar robotic characters in television shows and 
movies like Lost in Space, Terminator, Star Wars, and Star Trek: The Next 
Generation. 
These literary and artistic sources—and many others we could name—
already give us a sense of what robots might do and the problems that their 
introduction into society might cause. We should not, however, be too 
confident that we have seen this particular movie before, or confuse the 
vividness of our imagination with certainty about what technology and society 
have in store for us. 
 
 
 47. Daedalus, MYTHS ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.mythencyclopedia.com/Cr-Dr/ 
Daedalus.html. 
